Abstract
Introduction

This research examines the roles played by Moroccan and Tunisian labour in the 2011
Arab Uprisings and their aftermath, with the aim of contributing fresh evidence to the long-standing debate over the place of social classes in democratisation processes.
Morocco and Tunisia are particularly fit for comparison because they are relatively similar cases, despite the fact that the first is a monarchy and the second a republic. In fact, they are both Maghribi countries and share the legacies of the French protectorate However, workers with no union responsibilities, top-level union leaders, social movement and party activists, civil servants, experts and members of the unemployed associations were also interviewed. Moving outside of the capital cities and talking with activists and workers located in different positions in respect to the labour confederations allowed the author to gain a more multi-faceted and articulated grasp of Morocco and Tunisia's working-class mobilisations and trade unionism.
The first section discusses labour in democratisation processes with a specific focus on the Arab Uprisings; it then spells out the indicators of working-class power used for this research. The second section provides a brief account of the historical construction of working-class power in Morocco and Tunisia and a description of the respective balances of class power on the eve of the Uprisings. Against this background, the last section tells how the relevant actors behaved during the Uprisings and in their aftermath, tracing the developments that resulted in the outcomes under investigation.
Measuring class power: The working class in the 2011 Arab Uprisings
Class power and democracy
In the historical debate over social classes and democratisation, some authors argued that the bourgeoisie (e.g. Moore, 1966) or the middle class (e.g. Lipset, 1960 ) have a privileged role, while others claimed that labour has historically been the most consistent pro-democracy collective actor because democracy is in the interest of the workers (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1985; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Therborn, 1977) . In the latter view, working-class power is an important positive factor in democratisation processes.
Academic work on labour in the 2011 Arab Uprisings has also maintained that labour was a significant pro-democracy actor. Much research going in this direction deals with Egypt (Alexander and Bassiouny, 2014; Beinin, 2012; El-Mahdi, 2011; Totonchi, 2011) , which historically has been the Arab country attracting the greatest attention from labour scholars. More recently, Tunisian labour similarly came under the spotlight. This was due to the decisive role of rank-and-file trade unionists in the Uprising, which became clear as the UGTT turned into a central broker of the political negotiations that followed Ben Ali's downfall (Mizouni, 2012; Netterstrøm, 2016; Omri, 2017; Wilder, 2015; Yousfi, 2015) . 1 Tunisia is the only country concerned in the Uprisings that has democratised, and organised labour participated directly in this outcome. In a comparative perspective, both Beinin (2016) and Allinson (2015) imply that the fact that Tunisia had the strongest working class in the Arab world contributed to its democratisation. In a similar vein, Del Panta (2017) holds that authoritarian resilience in Algeria is due, among other things, to labour weakness there.
However, the claim that Tunisia was the Arab country in which working-class power was highest before the Uprisings is not uncontroversial. In fact, in an important pre-Uprisings study on 13 Arab countries, Cammett and Posusney suggested that the country where labour had most leverage was Morocco:
General political liberalization should enhance union freedoms, and the struggle for organizing rights is intrinsically part of democratization movements. Variation in the authoritarian structures of Middle Eastern countries, and related differences in unionstate relations, suggests arenas where progress can be expected, at least in the short term. Thanks to both partisan competition and competitive unionism, Morocco is already furthest along in freedom of association and appears to provide the best environment for additional advancement. ... Thus, this paper lends further support to the comparative finding that single party states appear to have the most resilient form of authoritarianism and suggests the intriguing possibility that some of the historically conservative monarchies of the region may ultimately prove to be the most progressive on labor rights. (Cammett and Posusney, 2010: 276) The validity of this claim cannot be assessed against the existing literature. Recently published academic research on Moroccan labour is very scant and almost non-existent in the English literature. Zemni et al. (2012) compared workers' struggles in the 2011 Arab Uprisings of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, but the article -while valuable -contains no substantial analysis of Moroccan trade unionism. Buehler (2015) produced an article showing how, in 2011, the Moroccan unions gained socioeconomic concessions thanks to the context of political instability. But the second most recent English-language work on Moroccan unions is a short MERIP report dating from 30 years before (Clement and Paul, 1984) . At the time of writing the present article, there is no published academic work, in any language, providing an in-depth comparison of working-class power in Morocco and Tunisia. The article thus contributes to filling this gap in the literature.
According to Cammett and Posusney: 'Moroccan exceptionalism reflects that country's long history of competitive unionism ' (Cammett and Posusney, 2010: 271) . But this emphasis on the institutional arrangement of competitive unionism might be partially misleading. The right to form alternative trade unions is certainly an asset for workers (and it falls under the indicator of civil and political rights below), but union fragmentation is often considered as a liability (e.g. Korpi and Shalev, 1979) . Thus, whether the abundance of labour confederations is positive or negative for workers should be established through a historical analysis of the processes through which they came into being, depending on the relative weight of mobilisation from below versus divide-and-conquer tactics from above. Therefore, competitive unionism is not the best single indicator for measuring working-class power and a multidimensional approach is preferable.
Erik Olin Wright defines class power in these terms: 'In the context of class analysis, power can be thought of as the capacity of individuals and organizations to realize their class interests ' (Wright, 2000: 962) . He then distinguishes between working-class 'structural power' -depending on workers' position in the economic system -and 'associational power' -depending on the strength of labour organisations. This distinction is particularly useful because structural power, unlike most indicators on associational power, provides information on the potential for workers' mobilisation both within and without the trade unions and, as we will see, the Uprisings featured both kinds of mobilisation.
For analytical purposes, the lower layers of the waged middle class are included here within the working class, given the convergence of interests and organisations of the two categories. Unwaged workers are also included, as the author shares the perspective according to which, especially in the global South, it is misleading to consider as working-class members waged employees only (see Van Der Linden, 2014) .
Working-class power is seen here as arising both from 'economic' factors (e.g. sectors of employment or characteristics of the labour market) and 'political' factors (e.g. civil and political rights or collective bargaining institutions). However, this relation should not be seen in deterministic terms. Working-class power, even in its most structural elements like the sectorial location of the workers, is historically constructed through successive rounds of social struggles and can change through further conflicts. A given balance of class power indicates a certain distribution of resources between classes, pointing to a range of likelier outcomes. But actual outcomes and the way in which they occur can in no way be pre-determined in the face of the agency of social actors that mobilise class power through contingent strategies. Table 1 )
Indicators of working-class power (see
To assess working-class structural power in Morocco and Tunisia, the following indicators are singled out as the most informative, given the availability of data and the characteristics of the cases:
1. Sectorial location refers to the distribution of employment in economic sectors that tend to provide, other things being equal, more mobilising potential and more advantageous conditions to the workers (e.g. manufacturing versus agriculture). Moreover, in the absence of complete and reliable data on wages, the combination of GNI per capita and inequality indexes outlines a picture of the national distribution of income to the workers. This is also consistent with the theoretical choice of including unwaged workers in the working class.
4. The social wage refers to the level of public expenditure for welfare services and it indicates the extent to which workers are independent of the market for their education, health and social security, and of charity for poverty relief. This partial decommodification, in turn, reinforces their bargaining power.
Some apparently obvious indicators, like wage levels and unemployment rates, do not appear in the list. The problem with wages is the absence, at time of writing, of publicly available complete data for the Moroccan private sector. Comparing the legal minimum wage of the two countries presupposes that it is equally applied in both, which is very far from warranted for all legal indicators. Unemployment rates are normally used as an indicator for the tightness or looseness of national labour markets, which in turn affects workers' bargaining power. Official unemployment rates, however, are not very meaningful in global South countries that do not provide unemployment subsidies. In fact, workers are thus forced to somehow work anyway, no matter the availability of 'decent' employment. Unemployment rates in the global South are lower than in the West, but working-class structural power is not higher in the former. Morocco's official unemployment rate in 2010 was 9%, four percentage points lower than Tunisia's 13% (ILOSTAT), which even used a more restrictive definition of unemployment. However, these numbers have a very limited meaning, knowing that in the same year 23.5% of the Moroccan employed population fell within the 'unpaid employed' category (HCP, 2011) .
Surely, both Moroccan and Tunisian workers face extremely loose labour markets, marred by acute underemployment and precarity.
To assess associational power, the following indicators are used:
1. Trade union density is the most common indicator of union power. Other things being equal, unions with more members can stage larger and more effective mobilisations. The preciseness of this indicator is affected by the fact that unions can sometimes mobilise non-members too. However, as shown below, it is in Tunisia (where union density is higher) that trade unionists contributed more successfully to mobilise the non-unionised.
2.
Collective bargaining coverage reflects the unions' capacity to improve workers' wages and conditions through collective agreements, and it is, therefore, another classic indicator of union power.
3. Civil and political rights define the range of contentious action to which workers and their organisations can recur without facing state repression and the extent to which workers can elect representatives of their choosing in state institutions.
4.
Internal democracy is not a direct indicator of union power, but it refers to the extent to which union power is the power of the workers, rather than just power over the workers (see Hyman, 1975) . This aspect is of particular importance in authoritarian countries, where unions can be little more than appendages of the regime. Limitations of internal democracy can appear both as bureaucratic practices restraining rank-and-file democracy through formal rules (see Camfield, 2013 ) and as patrimonial practices through which the union leaders maintain undemocratic control by violating formal rules.
The reader will notice the absence of labour parties, tripartite institutions and competitive unionism. In fact, these elements cannot be considered as straightforward indicators of working-class associational power, because they can act as vehicles of both empowerment and co-optation/weakening depending on the context. They will be discussed in the empirical section, but they cannot be synthesised as univocal indicators.
Also missing is the breadth of union freedoms in the two countries before 2011 because it is difficult to assess. Stallings (2010) used an index composed of legal provisions and reports on labour law violations by the International Trade Union Confederation, the US State Department and the ILO. The resulting index states that de facto union freedoms were higher in Morocco than in Tunisia. However, evidence from the author's interviews and archival research points towards the opposite direction. For example, the author witnessed three cases (Doha, Maghreb Steel, Med Paper) in which hundreds of striking Moroccan workers were fired for defending their union representatives against illegal layoffs. While anti-union discrimination in the Tunisian private sector is a very widespread phenomenon, to the author's knowledge violations on this scale are unseen there. In any case, both reports by international agencies and qualitative fieldwork are anecdotal evidence for a quantitative phenomenon and cannot be seen as conclusive.
Despite the gaps in the data, the overall divergence between Morocco and Tunisia on the above indicators is significant and coherent enough to allow for solid conclusions on their different balances of class power before the Uprisings. In Morocco, the regime that emerged after Independence was built on a conservative social basis led by rural landowners. In 1961, the new king Hassan II took direct control of the executive and reversed the Istiqlal's initial redistributive and industrialising policies, as he feared that an overhaul of agriculture would undermine his rural power base (Leveau, 1985 (Leveau, [1976 ). The splits within the National Movement after its failure to gain control of the state led to the early beginnings of competitive unionism in Morocco,
with the foundation of the Istiqlal-linked Union Générale des Travailleurs du Maroc
(UGTM) (see Menouni, 1979) . Meanwhile, since the defeats of the early 1960s, the UMT leadership grew increasingly compromising with the Palace.
In Tunisia, on the other hand, the new regime was based on a populist social basis, which resulted in a programme of import-substitution industrialisation and a series of material concessions to the working class that were never to be seen in Morocco (Ben Romdhane, 2011) . There was a deep overlapping of memberships in the single party, the single trade union and the state; a triangular state-party-union architecture typical of populist corporatist regimes. But the UGTT -while allied to the regime -preserved a certain degree of autonomy, the scope of which varied historically depending on the political conjuncture (see Hamzaoui, 2013) .
In both countries, the 1970s were characterised by the leftwards radicalisation of the student movement and by a large strike wave (Belaïd, 1989 (Benhlal, 1985) .
In Tunisia, conversely, the New Left ex-students joined the workforce and the UGTT at once. While workers grew restive, the radicals demanded internal democracy and challenged the submission of the union to the ruling Destourian Party (see Bellin, 2002) .
These mobilisations culminated in the 26 January 1978 UGTT general strike, that was violently crushed by the security forces. The regime jailed and tried tens of union cadres, including the quasi-totality of the UGTT National Executive Committee (NEC). But, despite the defeat, these struggles dismantled the triangular state-party-union architecture as it used to be, an achievement with far-reaching, long-term consequences that did not obtain in the other Arab populist countries. On the one hand, a solid leftist opposition had emerged within the confederation. On the other hand, after this bitter conflict, the top union leadership ceased to be a reliable ally of the regime. After structural adjustment, Morocco partially opened its political system while in Tunisia authoritarianism remained steadfast. In the mid-1990s, Hassan II started negotiating with the opposition parties to prepare a smooth transmission of the throne to his son Mohammed VI. The CDT and the UGTM toed the line of their parties and, since 1994, took part in a series of negotiations aiming to institutionalise a consultative social dialogue (Catusse, 1998) . In 1998, the USFP was thus allowed to lead the government.
The socialists hoped to democratise the country and improve social justice, but these goals remained largely unmet. Because of this, in the 2000s, the CDT distanced itself from the USFP and entered a phase of splits and decline. From these splits, the USFPlinked Fédération Démocratique du Travail (FDT) emerged, but the electoral weight and political significance of the USFP kept falling.
In Tunisia, between 1985 and 1988 , the regime survived on sheer labour repression.
However, the continuing rise of the Islamists on the one hand and persistent wildcat strikes on the other made this arrangement untenable (Alexander, 1996) . Ben Ali, who had taken power on 7 November 1987, needed a social basis to contain the Islamists and the easiest solution was reconstituting the corporatist alliance with the UGTT in a neoliberal 'post-populist' form. Material concessions to the workers were partially retrenched, which was 'compensated' by a potentiated network of patron-client corrupting practices penetrating the union (Feltrin, forthcoming) . In sum, the divergent outcomes of historical social struggles in Morocco and Tunisia led to a different balance of class power in the two countries on the eve of the Uprisings. In the aftermath of National Liberation, Moroccan labour was marginalised by the ruling social coalition and it was unable to decisively influence the policies of the regime. The UMT's declining power encouraged its leadership to increasingly compromise with the Palace despite the lack of concessions, and to take a conservative position when the 1970s upsurge of social unrest came. The neoliberal turn saw the further weakening and fragmentation of Moroccan trade unionism, a crisis widely recognised in public debates.
In Tunisia, the central role played by the UGTT in the National Movement allowed it to gain a strong foothold in the social coalition underlying the new regime, and to influence its initial policies to a large extent. This resulted in a populist social pact in which the working class gained significant material concessions but came at the cost of the partial subordination of the confederation to the regime. Despite this, when neoliberal restructuring started to take root in the 1970s, workers' mobilisations were able to push the UGTT leadership to acts of radical opposition. While these attempts ended in defeat, they formed cracks in the triangular state-party-union architecture of populist corporatism and built a relatively strong militant power base within the UGTT.
A different balance of class power
This section provides further evidence for the thesis that, on the eve of the 2011
Uprisings, working-class power was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco. Some of the figures in Tables 2 and 3, while The social wage -+ Public expenditure on social benefits (% of GDP) 4.3% (2011) 10 7.7% (2011) Therefore, the problem of "disengagement", or of the privatisation of social protections, did not represent a radical break' 4 (Catusse, 2010: 189) . 
Union density in Tunisia was probably almost four times as high as in Morocco in 2010
and has increased after the Uprising. In 2010, an ILO report estimated union density in the Tunisian private sector at 27% (ILO, 2010) . This is an exaggeration, and the 10-15% estimated by the European Commission (2015) seems more accurate. But the latter figure is still higher than Morocco's overall union density of 6%, which includes the more unionised public sector. Moroccan unions lament widespread, systematic and severe antiunion behaviours in the private sector, despite the Labour Code.
In Tunisia, since the 1970s, national and national-sectorial collective bargaining also applies to non-unionised workers, which results in a collective bargaining coverage of about 90%. In 2010, Morocco only had one national-sectorial collective agreement (for bank employees), one multi-employer local agreement (for truck drivers working with the Casablanca Port) and 10 firm-level collective agreements (Agueniou, 2010) .
Until the Uprisings, union democracy in Tunisia was marred by the regime's attempts to impose a pliant leadership. But the struggles of the 1970s made unilateral state control over the UGTT untenable. This resulted in a compromise in which the union leadership had to be acceptable both to the regime and most of the union base. Up to the 2000s, the regime kept intervening effectively and in manifold ways in internal union life (Feltrin, forthcoming) . However, basic internal regulations -like the periodic election of the union leaders through congresses -were respected.
In Morocco, the unions' internal democracy was only indirectly constrained by the regime through (decreasing) limits on the space for political opposition and (enduring) tolerance for union repression in the private sector. Because of low union density, legitimation and funding for the unions come more from the state than from their members. It is estimated that only 10-15% of the Moroccan unions' budget comes from membership fees (Trari, 2017) . 5 This imbalance allowed for severe disregard for internal The analysis of these multiple indicators thus shows that overall working-class power, in both its structural and associational dimensions, was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco on the eve of the 2011 Arab Uprisings.
Using class power: The trade unions in the 2011 Arab Uprisings and their aftermath
Morocco: Trade union fragmentation and regime resilience
This section provides a narrative of the 2011 mobilisations in Morocco. It will be shown that the Moroccan trade union leaderships faced relatively weaker pressures from below compared to Tunisia and that they had less power vis-a-vis the regime. Most of them, therefore, eventually supported the non-democratic constitutional reform led by the Palace and none took radical action (e.g. general strikes) against the regime. This is different from Tunisia, where, despite the compromising attitude of the top union leadership, the UGTT was pressured by the revolts of the precarious workers and by its own internal dissidents to call for the regional general strikes that were essential in the downfall of the regime.
In the late 2000s, various social mobilisations emerged in Morocco, particularly over employment, the cost of living and access to resources (Bogaert, 2015) . The most remarkable were the Bouarfa movement against rising water prices and the Sidi Ifni movement for employment. Local union activists participated in both cases.
Graph 1 -Strike activity in Morocco and Tunisia 1994-2014
The comparative value of this graph is limited by the fact the Moroccan Ministry of Employment does not record strikes in the public administration. important were: all public administration wages were raised by 600 dirhams (US$77.6 at the time) per month; the share of public employees to be promoted went from 28% to 33%; the minimum old-age pension increased from 600 dirhams to 1000 dirhams (US$129.4 at the time); and the national minimum wage increased by 15%. The unions had thus far been unable to win these concessions by their own strength, but regional instability and mounting social unrest pushed the regime to accommodate them.
On 9 March 2011, Mohammed VI announced a constitutional reform that partially addressed the demands of the M20Fev. But the latter refused these proposals since it maintained that the new constitution had to be drafted by a democratically elected constitutional assembly and not by a committee appointed by the king. The USFP, however, agreed to engage in this political process, which distanced its associated union FDT from the M20Fev.
The UMT left attempted to rally the whole confederation in support of the M20Fev. It did so most effectively in Rabat, where its control of the regional executive committee allowed it to make the union premises available to the M20Fev for assemblies, events and related activities. The Rabat UMT also created the network 'Trade Unionists for the Whatever the plausibility of these claims, the crucial fact is that the CDT alone did not have the power to call a successful general strike. In fact, the country's second union had a self-declared membership of 61,500 (0.6% of the employed), hardly enough to change the political equilibrium.
An interviewed M20Fev activist made the following comment: This has pressured the Moroccan state to take hard and sharp decisions regarding the UMT left. (Rabat, 14 March 2016) It took years for a new compromise to be found between the UMT left and its leadership, but the overall result was a renewed weakening of internal democracy within the country's largest union. This somewhat reflected the situation of the country, as the regime moved to limit several of the concessions delivered in 2011.
Tunisia: Trade union polarisation and democratisation via insurrection
In In this tense context, the Gafsa Revolt broke out on 5 January 2008 (Allal, 2010) . The mobilisation started as an informal protest by the precarious youth for secure employment and local development, with striking similarities to Morocco's Sidi Ifni movement (Allal and Bennafla, 2011) . In the village of Redeyef, public administration UGTT militants led by Adnen Hajji set up a negotiating committee to support the precarious youth's demands. They were thus able to turn the protest into a protracted social movement. The opposition between the politicised UGTT militants and the Gafsa UGTT regional executive committee was at the fore, and, on 19 February 2008, the latter froze Hajji's UGTT membership.
The 'witch-hunt' within the UGTT and the events of Gafsa prompted the dissident trade unionists to step up their efforts for internal democracy. This resulted in the establishment of an internal UGTT current called Rencontre Syndical Démocratique Militant (RSDM), aiming to coordinate all the progressive dissident tendencies within the confederation.
Two leaders of the RSDM explained to the author:
[The RSDM] was a leftist group that wanted to make internal democracy in the UGTT. As we always say that the UGTT is the engine of the country, we wanted to limit the mandates of the UGTT's leader in order to do the same with the country as a whole. 8 (Tunis, 10
December 2015)
For the first time the internal opposition jointly organised and acted as such. Because the opposition had always been there, but before each group tended to act alone. movement, the coordination with the other organised actors, and the mediation with the political and trade union authorities (Yousfi, 2015: 65) . Another crucial task was using the UGTT's infrastructure to spread the movement geographically and reduce police pressure on the mobilised cities. A primary school teacher from Gafsa brought his own example:
I had been in touch with the comrades in Tunis, Sfax, Kasserine. Yeah, on the phone. ...
[An UGTT militant from Kasserine] got mad at me and said: 'Do something in Gafsa or don't ever call me again!' So on 11 January we decided to march from the UGTT premises 
Conclusion
This article has shown how different levels of working-class power were historically constructed through divergent trajectories of social struggles in Morocco and Tunisia. It has argued that, on the eve of the 2011 Arab Uprisings, working-class power was higher in Tunisia than in Morocco and that this facilitated a more significant role of Tunisia's trade unions in democratic struggles.
Overall working-class power in Tunisia was higher in both its structural and associational dimensions. Higher levels of 'human development' and welfare provisions (e.g. education) constituted more resources for the mobilisation of non-unionised precarious workers in the marginalised regions. The larger size of industry, of the public sector and of the share of workers enjoying relative job security allowed the secure workers to mobilise effectively in solidarity with the precarious. In order for this to actually happen, the initiative of activists on the ground was crucial in building pressure on the UGTT top leadership, so that the union's associational power could be used to bring into existence solidarity between different working-class factions.
Conversely, in Morocco, relatively low structural working-class power endowed the Moroccan precarious workers with fewer resources to mobilise, while the secure workers constituted a more limited share of the population. The lower radicality of the protests meant that the Moroccan trade unions faced weaker pressures towards radical action, which contributed to the compromising line held by the majority of their leaders in spite of the efforts towards the opposite direction by many activists. Moreover, the associational weakness of the unions facilitated the regime strategy of fragmenting and depoliticising social protest along sectorial demands that could be managed within the system in place.
These findings are in line with the claims of authors identifying Tunisia as the Arab country featuring the highest level of working-class power and reinforce the broader theory according to which working-class power usually facilitates democracy. However, they do not exclude future democratisation in Morocco. In fact, working-class power in Morocco appears to be higher than in most other Arab countries and could increase significantly relative to its levels of 2011. Additionally, working-class power is only one among several factors that can facilitate democratisation.
These conclusions do not idealise Tunisia as a workers' paradise; very far from it.
Tunisian workers' power is high relative to the standards of a staunchly labour-repressive region. Moreover, since democratisation, Tunisian workers have faced rising unemployment, stagnating real wages and declining standards of living. The UGTT's political incorporation in the new order has failed to deliver on social justice, putting the union in a difficult position especially vis-a-vis the precarious factions of the working class, whose mobilisations have continued, including the latest wave of unrest in January 2018. The inability of the Tunisian democracy to address the grievances of most citizens poses a serious legitimacy problem for democracy in the region as a whole. The social struggles of the future will tell whether these dilemmas will be resolved through more democracy or a full-scale return of authoritarianism. represented dues from public sector employees (who are charged more than private sector workers), collected by the state through a direct check-off system. The state could and did suspend this system in times of crisis. But most militant trade unionists were to be found in the public sector, and they did use their membership to pressure the UGTT NEC.
6. The Union Nationale du Travail au Maroc (UNTM) is the labour confederation linked to the Islamist
Parti de la Justice et du Développement (PJD).
7. The interviews were conducted in French. All the quoted excerpts were translated into English by the author.
8. According to the Tunisian Constitution of the time, presidential candidates could not be older than 75.
As Ben Ali had turned 74 in 2010, he was trying to amend it in order to run for a new mandate.
